



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

29 JUL 1977

C-3,846/RCI-3

TO: Mr. Calvin E. Davis
Executive Secretary
Security Committee
Intelligence Community Staff
Washington, DC 20505

SUBJECT: Community-Wide Adherence to DCID 1/14

Reference: Your memorandum, 12 July 1977, subject as above.

The following comments are provided in response to the questions posed in paragraph 2.a. through e. of reference:

a. As you are aware, personnel security investigative support to DIA is provided by the Defense Investigative Service (DIS). SBI coverage afforded by the DIS is in conformity with current DCID 1/14 investigative standards. It should be noted, however, that one vital component of any personnel security investigative scope, the Local Agency Check, is becoming increasingly less available (through no fault of the DIS). In recent years, more states and/or local communities have enacted legislation or instituted procedures which deny criminal records information to Department of Defense investigators. This practice has been of concern to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration).

b. DIA considers current DCID 1/14 minimum standards to be sufficient to ensure comparability of SBI screening among Intelligence Community agencies, provided that each agency adheres to the minimum standards. Of course, this matter is currently under review by the SECOM's Investigative Standards Working Group (ISWG). We may have to alter our perception of minimum investigative standards based on the findings of the ISWG.

c. DIA maintains a strict computer-assisted, file control suspense system which insures that all SCI-cleared personnel are investigated every five years. In those cases where DIA military personnel with SCI access are assigned to Defense Attache Offices (DAO) overseas, we substitute "on-station checks," which consist of supervisor/coworker interviews and additional local checks, as appropriate. The "on-station checks" are normally conducted when an individual transfers from one DAO to another or if he returns to the U.S. for assignment at DIA Headquarters. The normal DAO tour is two to three years in duration.

In addition to certifying SCI access for its own personnel, DIA functions as the SCI eligibility authority for the major DoD component agencies (excluding the Military Services and NSA). These "customer" components also maintain a five-year reinvestigation program.

DIA review completed.

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d. Briefings concerning basic security, including SCI programs, are based to a large extent on questions emanating from individual DIA elements and are tailored to the element's particular requirements. They include warnings about the shortfall inherent in the background investigation program (e.g., DIS manpower, Privacy Act problems faced by investigative personnel, the need to be continually alert for indications of loyalty/suitability problems, and reporting procedures to be followed when such indicators are detected).

e. Within the DoD, the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) functions as a referral service for authorized requesters of personnel security investigative information pertaining to members of the DoD and Military Services. Although the DCII does not maintain any files, it does provide limited case file identification data, which, in turn, enable the requester to contact the appropriate investigative repository. An extension of this procedure, possibly in the form of a data base or a referral/retrieval service under the management of the Intelligence Community staff which would collate basic information on SCI denials from all community member agencies might be hypothetically feasible. When denying SCI access, each member agency could provide such particulars as name of the individual, denying agency, date of denial, and identification of investigative repository where the case file is maintained. This information would then be available to other community agencies by means of a check with a centralized data base. Such a check could be made part of the National Agency Check. The charter of an Intelligence Community Index of this nature would have to specify:

- (1) Management by the DCI.
- (2) Member agencies would not be required to establish or maintain any special system of derogatory security files.
- (3) Derogatory files containing denial information would be maintained only by the appropriate investigative agency (the DIS, in the case of DoD).
- (4) The appropriate investigative repository would have authority to release all investigative data in its possession and would not refer Privacy Act or Freedom of Information requests to a member agency which had previously denied SCI access.


KARL V. HAENDLE
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